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Abstract 
 
The Western worldview of deviance is supplemented by the expanding jurisdiction of the 
expert reliant on specific forms of technical, objective, positivistic knowledge. While the 
structural analysis of positivism is necessary, as well as the discussion of the supporting 
social policy and social control, the consequences of socially-constructed deviance and 
social control would not be complete without looking at the gaps and inconsistencies in 
knowledge. An analysis of agency and constraint and the role of the subject as an active 
agent is also necessary when examining deviance. The positivistic objective framework 
has had the intended effect of curing disease, controlling behaviour, and improving 
health. However, as knowledge accumulates, it may also become separated from human 
experience and practice (agency). This major paper will examine selected works of Marx, 
Foucault, Gadamer, and Giddens that focus on the relationship of structure and agency in 
order to lessen the gap between those who socially construct knowledge and those who 
are deemed deviant.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
The presence of scientific disciplines in the field of Criminology, and the 
concurrent rise of the expert, have brought specific forms of technological, objective 
knowledge that construct realities. As an epistemology, positivism and its related 
methods gave rise to criminology as a discipline which supported expert knowledge in 
lawmaking, lawbreaking, and law enforcement at the expense of the human story (Jones, 
1986; Gilsinian, 2004). Criminologists helped frame the policy development process from 
problem definition to its final policy goals (Garland, 1997; 1996). Thus, the dominance of 
scientific disciplines in the field of criminology, and prominence of experts, brought 
specific forms of technological, objective knowledge – the social construction of deviance 
designations, its response, and its responsibility strategies. As Michel Foucault (1965) 
argued, scientific knowledge has been categorized, accumulated, and achieved through 
the subjugation of the objects of power – the sick and the deviant. This expert knowledge 
has resulted in various sovereign, welfare, and neo-liberal state strategies to identify, 
discipline, punish, treat, and hold responsible “troublesome” populations in an effort to 
achieve order.  
The definitions of deviance, its official state response, and notions of justice derive 
from social constructions. Objective knowledge becomes threatened by the changing 
definition of, and failed government responses to, deviance bringing experts to the 
forefront of identifying and managing deviance that serves the current priorities of 
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government. Deviance is often socially constructed and responses are also constructed to 
align with government goals. The implications for policy makers are that when 
government goals change, so do deviance designations (Fleming and Visano, 1983).  
This major paper is a critical assessment of how deviance becomes designated to 
serve the changing needs of government. Issues of gender, socioeconomic status, and 
power imbalances will be examined with regards to the use of expert knowledge. A 
theoretical understanding of the social construction of deviance will highlight concern 
about the premise that increased social control works for the common good. The systems 
mandated to help and hold responsible the deviant are remarkably compatible, and they 
often share the final responsibility for curing or controlling troublesome populations. This 
joint effort by government and various helping agencies has serious implications for 
prolonged expanded social control where those deemed deviant share responsibility in 
the management of their own behaviour, activities, or condition.  
The theoretical foundation for its existence must be understood, to better 
understand the present designations of deviance, Therefore, Chapter One will examine 
the theory of social construction as it relates to deviance, expert knowledge, and 
troublesome populations. In this chapter, the notion that, at specific points in history, 
social conditions determine the prominence of a particular theory, establish its experts, 
and advance strategies for response will be explored. Chapter Two will advance a critique 
of positivism, as well as examine various forms of sovereign and neo-liberal state 
governments, rituals of truth, technologies of domination, and individual freedoms.  
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Chapter Three will analyze the process of lawmaking by examining how deviance 
is responded to in public policy to serve the needs of government at particular times in 
history. The examples of midwifery, prostitution, and youth crime1 will highlight how 
problems get framed and responsibility determined. In this chapter, the analysis will go 
beyond a discussion of deviance to demonstrate how response and responsibility derive 
from changes in governmental priorities. Finally, Chapter Four will analyze Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s (1975; 1989) contribution to social theory, Philosophical Hermeneutics, in 
order to highlight the mistaken overemphasis on the methods of Positivism in social 
science. Beyond both Positivism and Hermeneutics, Anthony Gidden’s Theory of 
Structuration (1984) will bridge the gap between the structure of natural science 
(Positivism) and agency (Hermeneutics). Through the study of Structuration, the 
shortcomings of traditional social science can be highlighted and the potential for 
alternative truths can be achieved. 
A reconstruction of ‘theory of social construction’, ‘deviance’, ‘expert knowledge’, 
‘troublesome populations’, ‘governmentality’, ‘rituals of truth’, ‘individual freedom’, and 
‘public policy’, coupled with a review of Gadamer’s hermeneutics and Giddens’ theory of 
structuration, will advance alternative models to understand the role of deviance 
definitions in the social construction of justice. Thus, by positioning an analysis of agency 
and constraint within an examination of the role of criminology in public policy, it is 
                                                 
1
 The examples of midwifery, prostitution, and youth crime help us examine socially constructed and re-
constructed deviance, state responses, and the role of the expert. Other examples of deviance could have 
been employed, such as homelessness, drug-related crime and legislation, crimes against the environment, 
and white collar crime.  
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possible to analyze the problem of deviance and its response by lawmakers and 
lawbreakers as social constructions. In effect, how the problem of deviance is defined 
helps to create the realities for the social constructions that follow.  
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Chapter 1: The Theory of Social Construction and Deviance Designations 
 
The relationship between deviance, government, and experts must be understood 
within an historical context. Those with power identify, define, and socially construct 
deviance to determine strategies of response. Experts, working for the establishment, 
using supposedly objective methods to establish categories of deviance, tend to provide 
the evidence to support “appropriate” state interventions. Public attitudes begin to 
change, people become the problem, and experts recommend the cure. Hence, within 
the broad framework of technologies are structures and infrastructures that support and 
supplement the use of expert knowledge in the construction of deviance.  
Control of the fluid and changing system of expert knowledge is difficult. No 
infrastructure controls the use of expert knowledge. The locus of power is complex and 
changeable. It is this aspect of expert knowledge that gives back a level of individual 
control. However, the expert’s ability to identify, define, and shape public attitudes is 
paramount in the construction of deviance. Within this infrastructure, governments 
advocate the development and acceptance of expert knowledge, while also attempting to 
balance the interests of the public. In doing so, the government resists assessing expert 
knowledge in light of human experience and sacrifice, thereby supporting the social 
construction of deviance to serve its goals. 
The theory of social construction examines how social interaction moves from 
subjective meaning to external objective knowledge. Once knowledge becomes an 
objective truth, the process continues when members of society learn and internalize that 
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knowledge until it becomes part of one’s self. Deviance is often used to describe those 
behaviours, attitudes, or conditions that violate the objective reality created out of moral 
panics (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 2002). Lawbreakers become defined by lawmakers and 
subject to the response of law enforcers in an effort toward social control and order. 
Social construction theory, therefore, has been used effectively to criticize traditional 
criminology that relies on positivistic explanations of deviant behavior.  
Deviance, as a social construction, develops not out of an actual threat, but from 
the conditions of a particular social structure in a specific place and time in history.  
During times of social upheaval, or moral panics, deviants serve as diversions from 
society’s pressing, albeit insoluble problems (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 2002). The 
stereotyped deviant category may already exist, but during times of panic, they are 
targeted for official intervention. For example, homosexuals, deemed marginalized by the 
moral majority, face new accusations for creating the AIDS crisis. Thus, for a moral panic 
to achieve a collective understanding, regardless of the level of objective danger, the 
reaction of people to the perceived threat is based on hostility directed towards those 
who have or display different characteristics, behaviours, or belong to a marginalized 
category.  
During the moral panics, suddenly witches are burned; abortion clinics are 
bombed; sex shops are picketed; propagandists for psychedelic drugs are 
denounced; homosexuals are beaten; laws criminalizing marijuana 
possession and sales are passed, and users are arrested; suspected or known 
communists are dismissed from their jobs; pamphlets explaining how to 
protect children from stranger abduction are distributed to parents; the 
police use more repressive measures against misbehaving or delinquent 
adolescents. In most cases, a deviant category or stereotype already exists, 
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but it is latent and only routinely activated (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 2002: 
116-117). 
 
To understand how a deviant category is created, particular levels of theoretical 
analysis are used by academics and practitioners to advance specific variables as the main 
causes of deviance designations. As Little (1989) argued, definitions of deviance and 
madness have been explained unevenly along a continuum ranging from the supernatural 
to enlightenment. Thus, despite occasional halts and temporary reversals, the apparent 
causes of deviance and madness have been grounded, firstly, in the sacred, secondly, in 
the moralistic search for deficiencies in the individual (with natural science supporting 
this view), and thirdly, in locating the causes exclusively (or primarily) within the person 
(i.e. individual responsibilization)2 (Little, 1989). The example of midwifery assists in the 
understanding of the nature of theoretical paradigm shifts and socially-constructed 
deviance within a social historical process.  
The definition of reproduction has shifted from the normal and natural to the 
pathological and the medical. Romalis (1981) establishedthat childbirth was once the 
complete domain of the midwife until the middle ages. Midwifery was then defined as an 
unclean profession by the church which, based on theological and sacred theories, 
viewed female reproductive organs as evil. This misogyny of the church fathers saw 
midwifery as a degrading, but necessary function (Rich, 1976). 
                                                 
2
Responsibilization refers to an institution or government downloading responsibility for some function it 
used to provide, and displacing that responsibility onto its constituents, customers, or users (O’Malley; 
1996). 
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After this period, when scientific knowledge was accumulated and centralized, the 
definition of childbirth changed. For example, in the 13th century, European secular 
medical schools were attended by upper class men who assumed control of childbirth 
(Noonan, 2002). Rich (1976) stated that, at this point in the paradigm shift, the medical 
profession began to control healing, refusing to acknowledge the healing powers and 
empirical knowledge of women who worked for centuries among the poor. Further, these 
medical men were backed by the laws of the church which disapproved of female pagan 
healing practices.  
With paradigm shifts come new deviance designations. For example, in Witches, 
Midwives, and Nurses: A History of Women Healersr, Ehrenreich and English (1973) stated 
that midwives, during the 14th to 17th centuries, were labeled as witches. Midwives from 
Germany to England involved in natural healing represented a political, religious, and 
sexual threat to the church and the state (Ehrenreich and English, 1973). Reverend 
Krammer and Reverend Springer outlined, in the Malleus Maleficarum (Hammer of 
Witches 1484), that “no one does more harm to the Catholic Church than midwives” 
(Kramer and Springer, 1484: III q 34; Ehrenreich and English, 1973:11). Hence, as 
prescribed by the Malleus, and followed by judges of the time, women were subject to 
trials, excommunications, torture, and death (Ehrenreich and English, 1973). 
Ultimately, this historical paradigm shift from the natural act of childbirth to a 
medicalized procedure has had the continued effect of controlling women who give birth 
care outside the dominant system. The power to define, identify, and control deviance 
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has been transferred to experts and governments. Deviance is only recognized by 
government when it merits and justifies expert interpretation and intervention. Experts 
begin to accumulate knowledge and abstract their moral judgements into technical 
applications. 
The moral-scientific search for individual flaws, as Little (1989) outlined, is 
connected to the second general explanation for deviance and madness. This perspective 
argues that deviance and mental illness can be remedied by the systematic study of 
human behaviour and physiology. Early positivists argued that scientific applications 
could improve and even perfect the human condition. Drawing upon natural science, 
Cesare Lombroso, hailed as the founding father of modern criminology, is best known for 
his biological theory of atavism, or belonging to an evolutionary retarded species.  
Deviants, according to Lombroso’s (1876) biological explanation of crime, were 
biological throwbacks (Williams, 1988). Influenced by the views of Charles Darwin’s The 
Descent of Man (1871), Lombroso contended that some people were born with strong, 
innate predispositions to behave anti-socially evidenced by sensory impairment, a lack of 
moral sense, particularly the absence of remorse, the use of slang, and displaying tattoos 
(Williams, 1988). Lombroso defined and described these biologically abnormal people as 
homo delinquens, an evolutionary retarded species. In an effort to empirically prove these 
judgements, Lombroso (1876) collected vast amounts of data. Physical traits, like an 
asymmetrical skull, flattened nose, large ears, fat lips, enormous jaws, and Mongolian eye 
characteristics, were viewed as causally connected to deviance (Williams, 1988). 
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Lombroso used scientific rationalizations to justify inherently racist moral 
judgements. From the late 1800’s and early 1900’s, Lombroso’s theory of the born 
criminal was a dominant explanation for offending (Williams, 1988). For Lombroso, there 
was no cure; imprisonment was the only alternative to protect potential victims. Thus, 
the subjugation of the offender allowed for the development of early knowledge that 
supported the state response of imprisonment. 
Foucault (1965) highlighted that early scientific observation required the stripping 
of human context from particular knowledge bases. Through expert observation, the mad 
could be morally freed from the criminal, separating the “innocence of unreason from the 
guilt of crime” (Foucault, 1965: 221-222). Rather than madness being freed from power 
(the criminal deviant label), the mad were reconstituted as subjects of power and objects 
of knowledge, and thus controlled. To achieve social control, these individuals had to be 
isolated from the virtuous in society so more knowledge could be collected from them, 
with the purpose of entrenching their deviance designations and reproducing power.  
The question Foucault asked was “How and why were very different things in the 
world gathered together, characterized, analyzed, and treated as, for example, ‘mental 
illness?’” (Foucault, 1985: 327). Foucault (1985) did not negate the existence of madness 
and crime; instead, he showed how they continue to be the target of social regulation at a 
given moment. Foucault (1985) argued that as an historical event, unreason had to be 
separated from reason. This was done by associating the mentally ill with disease and 
crime. It was not solely through the accumulation of medical knowledge that allowed 
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physicians and psychiatrists to achieve substantial control of deviance and madness; 
primarily it was their authority, under a particular kind of government, that enabled them 
to do so (Foucault, 1985). 
For Foucault (1965), two technologies provide the conditions for social control 
through science. Specifically, social control through technology feeds the knowledge 
accumulation process. For example, surveillance, as a form of technology, and the 
technical language of judgement, works to position the authority structure as keeper of 
positive knowledge (physician/psychiatrist/criminologist) and the object of that 
knowledge (a patient/criminal who, by definition, was unreasonable and mad) (Smart, 
1985).  
According to Foucault (1977), “troublesome” populations must first be 
understood within an historical context before they can be constituted. By observing the 
discourse practices and the language of experts, the science of deviance can be 
understood. For example, the moral and scientific search for individual flaws, as Little 
(1989) outlined, is connected to early definitions and responses to deviance and madness. 
Early 18th century criminologists prescribed that deviance and mental illness could be 
remedied by the systematic scientific study of the biological characteristics of prisoners 
such as, lumps on the skull, heredity, and the presence of a Y chromosome as indications 
that the individual was predisposed to aggression and crime. 
Foucault (1977) famously used notions of discipline and punishment to link 
power/knowledge with the process of subjugation, as well as the accumulation of 
 12 
knowledge by experts of those deemed deviant. Once expert knowledge was and 
continued to be achieved, explanations of deviance were and are supported by 
governments and official administrative systems to coordinate and facilitate the 
“appropriate” response. Empirical laws are developed from positivistic classification 
schemes. Thus, the “value” of empirical laws is their ability to separate objective method 
from subjective human experiences. 
Currently, functioning within the psychiatric perspective, the responsibilization 
movement of deviance serves three functions. The first function is to separate the 
condition of deviance from the reality of a crime-free community and to create a reality 
of crime. This is done by displacing the responsibility of controlling crime to the public. 
Crime only exists if the people fail to prevent it from occurring. The second is to 
individualize deviance definitions so as to reduce collective social responsibility, which 
abstracts substantive inequality, and justifies personal accountability. The third function is 
to formulate empirical laws, manage risk, and match classification categories with case 
management priorities (Bendle, 1999; Rose, 1998). 
The psychiatric perspective of deviance locates causes exclusively within the 
“affected” individual. Specifically, disorders and deviance are stripped of their historical, 
moral component, and are considered internal in their causation. Unlike clear physical 
abnormalities, psychiatrists must search out etiology to justify the symptoms. Rather than 
focusing on changing the social structure (social inequalities that lead to deviance and 
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social control), methods are provided that categorize behaviour that entrench empirical 
laws.  
Empirical laws are developed from a positivistic methodology. As Fernandez 
(1981) outlined, the classification scheme accepts the idea that deviance and mental 
illness as disease is, by definition, classifiable behaviour that can be controlled, managed, 
and risk assessed. Thus, the value of empirical laws is their ability to separate objective 
method from human experience.  
Threaded through the manufacturing of deviance is the relationship between 
agency and constraint (subject/object). This relationship, as argued by Marx, becomes an 
objective reality fraught with contradictions (Marx and Engels, 1932; Larrain, 1979). For 
Marx, this contradictory reality is abstracted so subjects are unable to analyze the nature 
of oppression until they become aware of the false consciousness, through a process of 
mass propertylessness (Marx and Engels, 1932; Larrain, 1979). Described as sharing a 
tactical alliance with Marxism, Foucault (1965) stated that the relationship between 
agency and constraint, although at times abstracted, often functions at a level of 
individual consciousness (Lemke, 2001). The relationship between agency and constraint 
contributes to the understanding of how socially constructed deviance become reality.  
For Foucault (1965), people can understand the nature of their own oppression, 
but are limited in resisting oppression. Foucault (1965) argued that individuals cannot 
entirely know their own history (archive) because of gaps, ruptures, inconsistencies, and 
contradictions. These gaps must be analyzed to understand the construction of the 
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individual/collective reality by analyzing the practices of the administration. Marx 
outlined that people, as active agents, make their own history, but not within the 
conditions of their own choosing (Marx and Engels, 1932; Larrain, 1979). The limitation of 
choice is primarily due to the existence of the agent’s place within the structures. An 
example of loitering laws is helpful in understanding how structural constraint, as Marx 
argued, created the conditions that the poor are differentially defined as deviant because 
of their street-entrenched lifestyle. For him, those with homes would not need to loiter 
and, therefore, the condition of homelessness created by the structure established a 
category of deviants (those who loiter). For Foucault (1991), the language and practice of 
law as a tactic highlighted the relationship of agency to structure. If loitering laws and 
police enforcement practices were systematically applied to the homeless, the 
administration of law enforcement created a reality based on subjugation. The 
relationship of socially constructed deviance, agency, and structure is not a historical or 
even solely contextual and, therefore, needs to be rooted in the fertile ground of the 
power of government at particular times. 
Even if the deviant actions, characteristics, or categories of the deviant are not 
actually harmful, or less harmful than other non-deviant actions, deviance creates a fear 
that necessitates an official response (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 2002). Thus, a critical 
component of socially constructed deviance is the role of government in the enactment 
of legislation or criminal law (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 2002).  
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In summary, through the social construction of deviance, knowledge becomes an 
objective truth. Positivistic explanations for deviance become the accepted standard for 
understanding deviant people and behaviour. The marginalized become targeted by 
official government responses and backed by the powers of the state because of the 
state’s power to define, identify, and control deviance. Reliant on experts, the 
government depends on objective measures to determine control methods. Definitions of 
deviance support the changing goals of government relying on the level of the threat 
determined. Science becomes an instrument to facilitate the goals of government 
(Foucault, 1991). The power to identify and define deviance focuses attention on the 
relationship between government, its experts, and the accumulation of knowledge and 
the social construction of deviance. 
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Chapter 2: Positivism in Social Science, Truths, and 
Freedoms 
 
 Giddens (1976) highlighted three underlying assumptions of knowledge based on 
the positivistic methods of the “orthodox consensus”. The first of these three 
assumptions was the origin of social theory itself; historically, criminologists strove for the 
same logical and predictive powers as the natural sciences (Giddens, 1976). However, this 
positivistic thinking worked to obtain general laws that failed to incorporate the 
importance and complexity of people. It was presumed by early criminologists that by 
drawing upon “value free” methods and measuring instruments, personal bias and 
cultural differences could separate the knower from the known. Critics of positivism 
argued that scientific systematic studies were the product of value-laden, popular 
definitions of acceptable conditions and tolerance levels, rather than the objective 
uncovering of truths (Giddens, 1976). It was not solely through the lofty accumulation of 
knowledge that experts achieved control of deviance definitions; primarily, it was their 
authority under a particular kind of government that enabled them to do so. The example 
of overactive children will highlight how science creates the conditions for a new 
deviance designation. 
In the case of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), when the tolerance 
for socially disruptive children is low, scientific models/classification schemes are applied 
to the “affected” child, even when that cause may be social (Barkley, 2006). Waltzkin 
(1989) argued that social sources of human distress, such as the classroom structure, 
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family life, gender roles, and sexuality, must be excluded from the diagnosis of ADHD in 
order to control disruptive behaviour. Rather than focusing on changing the social 
structure (i.e. social inequalities that lead to disruption and social control), methods are 
employed that categorize behaviour within the context of science which further 
entrenches empirical “laws” (Waltzkin, 1989). Youth that disrupt the classroom are not 
seen as resistors to conservative education, but as deviant and in need of expert 
intervention, medication, and self-discipline. 
 The second assumption of the “orthodox consensus”, as outlined by Giddens 
(1976), was the positivistic concept of language. The “consensus” saw language as a form 
of communication and description, and failed to recognize the importance of language 
acts3 as a vital part in the construction of society (Giddens, 1976). Positivism reduces 
language to a rigid, unambiguous tool which itself communicates a truth that is stripped 
of the biases of the user and of the subject. For example, legal scholars and social 
scientists often draw upon Latin to communicate accurately with other professionals. This 
requirement for accuracy is critical when discussing concepts across cultures, times, and 
generations (Giddens, 1976). But, language acts are more than description – one 
language act occurs when a judge puts a person to death. The performative speech – “I 
sentence you to death” is a working action. Those theorists holding to the “orthodox 
                                                 
3Language, as a structure, exists as a resource enabling people to communicate. This structure has with it 
traditions, a set of expectations, and the opportunity for new language actions to occur. Actors can employ 
the social rule of language based on their own experience, socialization, and bias. Language acts include 
more than the information being conveyed. As performative speech, they include bias, personal 
preferences, and prejudices that now exist as actions beyond language. 
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consensus” did not see the importance of people creating and perpetuating the system 
and the structure through language. 
 The third assumption of the “orthodox” consensus was that there was not an 
adequate theory of human agency. The focus remained on a level of institutional analysis 
(structure) that did not see the central “nature” of agency – that is, an agents’ (or 
person’s) ability to transform actions and affect structures (Giddens, 1976). Specifically, 
the “consensus” never addressed the stock of mutual lay knowledge or ordinary language 
that people used to perpetuate society (Giddens, 1976). Lay knowledge is vital in the 
reproduction and production of society, and not merely the meta or technical language 
found in grand theoretical narratives and models. According to Giddens (1976), ordinary 
language is a rich base for information. For example, poets, musicians, and artists 
contribute to social history and the language base that cannot be replaced by meta 
technical language.  
 Giddens (1976) argued that language usage is often divorced from its historical 
meaning. For example, the phrase “the rule of thumb” is used to mean a general “taken 
for granted” rule. Yet, once the history of this phrase was brought to bear, its misogyny 
became clear; husbands who beat their “nasty wife” were instructed to use a stick no 
wider than a thumb (Rambler, 1782). To understand history, both forms of language (lay 
and technical) are necessary to obtain truth (Giddens, 1976). Yet, beyond the languages 
of agents, Giddens (1976) argued that the relationship between agents and structures 
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must be at the forefront of theoretical social science bridging the gap between face to 
face interaction – agency – and institutional analysis.  
 Postman (1992) argued that experts tended to be ignorant about any matter not 
directly related to their specialized area of control. For example, the average 
psychotherapist barely has even a superficial knowledge of literature, philosophy, social 
history, religion, or art, and is not expected to have such knowledge. Technology creates a 
system of values that demands the breakdown of the human experience into smaller, 
manageable, and controllable parts. Furthermore, experts now advise people on how to 
raise children, how to educate them, how to be lovable, how to make love, how to 
influence people, and to how to make friends (Postman, 1992). “There is no aspect of 
human relations that has not been technicalized and therefore regulated and controlled 
by experts” (Postman, 1992: 87). Individuals in society begin to question, as Franklin 
(1990) noted, their own experience which is now separate from knowledge. As Menzies 
(1989) outlined “the dictionaries tell us that technology is ‘the industrial arts and science’ 
(Oxford) or ‘the application of scientific knowledge to commerce and industry’ (Webster). 
We think the only useful knowledge is knowledge that is patentable, knowledge as 
commodity” (Menzies, 1989: 55). With knowledge broken down from the whole, 
individuals, now disconnected, feel a level of obligation to seek the technical advice of 
experts. Individuals within the framework of technology no longer have the power to rely 
on personal concrete experiences for knowledge. The notion of power is intrinsically tied 
to technology and social control. 
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 Franklin (1990) argued that power is linked to notions of social control and 
technology. Technology, she argued, has been the catalyst for dramatic changes in the 
locus of power. In this regard, experts and governments are involved in a negotiation with 
technology to obtain power. Franklin stated, “Shifts in power and control are going on all 
the time. These processes are complex and interactive. Technologies exist … all in 
particular contexts and these contexts are usually fluid and changeable” (Franklin, 1990: 
56). As Ferkiss (1969) noted, the government, drawing upon the technology of experts, is 
a matrix of pressures and opinions from within and outside, each contributing to the final 
decision which itself may be part of a shifting process of power. Thus, regardless of the 
context or interchange between infrastructures, experts and technology are always a part 
of the power of government. The example Franklin (1990) offered suggested that the 
power of technology leads to the restructuring of attitudes. For example, speeding laws 
originally were created to address issues of public safety and not individual control. Yet, 
the technology of radar guns restructured the attitudes of police to focus attention on 
deterrence. However, because of the fluid nature of technology, individuals have 
captured their own powerful response; namely radar detectors. Individuals using this 
technology shifted the technological control from the police back to themselves. But, 
radar detector detectors have now returned a level of control (with the use of 
technology) to police. Regardless, the original issue, public safety, has been redefined in 
light of technology. Although this scenario, as offered by Franklin (1990), may be 
simplistic, it does outline how technology has the power to control and, at times, 
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transform social attitudes. Furthermore, it outlines that in order to manipulate  
technology, as experts and governments might like to do, it is difficult because of 
unintended, unpredictable consequences of technological advancements and human 
agency. 
Governmentality: Rituals of Truth 
Foucault (1991) coined the concept of governmentality as a guideline for the 
analysis of state power changes from Ancient Greece through to modern neo-liberalism. 
The linking of governing and modes of thought indicated that it is not possible to study 
the practices and application of power (i.e. the creation of deviance designations) without 
an analysis of the political rationality/economy underpinning them. Foucault (1991) 
showed that, well into the 18th century, government was placed in a philosophical, 
religious, and medical context. The problem for a sovereign government was the 
population that had to be controlled through war and violence. Sovereignty splits from 
Church or religious rule as a supreme lawmaking authority.  For Foucault (1991), 
sovereignty had been replaced by a new kind of governmentality – forms of power 
(institutions, procedures, police, and multi-form tactics) which targets populations. 
Beyond the sovereign state definition of government’s power over territory and subjects, 
neo-liberal governmentality refers not to an absolute common good (i.e. obedience to 
law or God), but towards an ‘end’ which is convenient for each of the things that are to be 
governed (Foucault, 1991). For example, the new art of government ideally established a 
continuity between self (morality), family (economy), and state (politics) that correctly 
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manages people based on principles of the political economy. Foucault described this 
governing as the “meticulous” attention of a father to the family for the common welfare 
of all. Government ensures the greatest possible wealth, sufficient subsistence for its 
people, and the conditions for population growth. Thus, governmentality applies to a 
variety of historical periods and to different specific power regimes (Foucault, 1991). In 
the case of neo-liberal governments, the notion of governmentality refers to societies 
where power is de-centralized and its members play an active role in their own self-
government (Rose, 1999; 1996; Garland, 1996).  
The tactics of the political economy intersect with the individual through a 
displacement from formal to informal techniques. Foucault’s (1991) governmentality 
discussion of neo-liberalism shows that there has been no reduction of state sovereignty, 
but an expansion of the capillaries of power. The strategy of establishing individual, 
family, and community “responsibilization” strategies entails shifting the responsibility for 
preventing and responding to illness, unemployment, and crime by encouraging people to 
be both morally responsible and economically rational (Rose, 1999; Garland, 1996; 
O’Malley, 1996). These public policy strategies serve the changing goals of government 
and definitions of deviance. 
This new form of governmentality produces its reality through “rituals of truth”4 
and creates a particular subjectivity which one conforms to or resists; as individuals are 
                                                 
4
 Expert knowledge is formed by persons who are authorized by the state and qualified in the practice of 
“truth”, whether medicine, psychiatry, or criminology. Truth is power gained by working with the affected 
in asylums, hospitals, and prisons. This knowledge becomes truth, adopted into practice (ritual), by experts 
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taken into this subjectivity, they become part of the normalizing force (Foucault, 1991). 
To a large extent, the “rituals of truth” are internalized by people, but there are also 
technologies, incentives and reinforcements for conforming to the rules. In this case, 
people play an active role in their own self-government (posited in neo-liberalism) to 
optimize living conditions for individuals as members of a population, linking individual 
and government goals (Foucault, 1991). This government is made possible by the creation 
of expert knowledge, institutions, and disciplines (i.e. medical, criminal justice, 
psychiatric) that continue to claim the knowledge necessary to command and facilitate 
the multi-form tactics5 of government supported by the people under its rule (Foucault, 
1991). For example, the practice of police prioritizing their calls in order of importance 
reflects a neo-liberal cost benefit approach that focuses attention on the seriousness of 
the crime, investigation outcomes (i.e. likelihood of arrest), and level of public concern 
                                                                                                                                                    
facilitating relations among the population. These rituals of truth are not innately bad or top down; instead, 
adaptive strategies that tasks people with the responsibility to become self-reliant. The neo-liberal state 
counsels personal responsibility and esteem for the political economy as its goals. Government weans the 
population off state funded provisions and promotes such programs aswelfare to work, restorative justice, 
community police crime prevention, and crime free multi-housing programs in an effort to re-empower 
individuals with the goals of the political economy intact. Although the welfare state failed to solve the 
complex social problems it took control of, like poverty and crime, the neo-liberal goal is to make these 
problems the responsibility of the individual, family, and the community despite their limitations. 
Ultimately, for Foucault (1991), knowledge works in a productive way that constructs social reality, as well 
as individual identity through a “ritual of truths”, defining and re-defining what will exist within the 
competency of government and what will not (i.e. public vs. private). 
 
5
 This network of tactics includes institutions (e.g. schools), procedures (surveillance, technology, 
regulations/policies), and analysis (science, research initiatives/think tanks) that allow government to 
define and re-define what the problems of government are and what will become the responsibility of the 
people. Those that can willingly serve the goals of individual responsibility and government will be 
celebrated, while those who cannot will be held accountable for their own self-care. 
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(Garland, 1996). Often, police response performance gets measured against customer 
satisfaction surveys rather than official crime rates/clearance rate (Bendle, 1999). 
Governmentality: The Technology of Domination 
 
Neo-liberal government represents a method of rationalizing the exercise of 
government that obeys the rule of the political economy (Foucault 1997). Neo-liberalism 
must create a social reality that it proposes already exists by facilitating multi-form tactics 
that make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the 
competence of the state and what is not; that is, the public versus the private (Foucault, 
1991). A government’s survival and its limits must be understood on the basis of the 
tactics used. Through adaptive neo-liberal strategies, the state can govern its subjects, -- 
not through intrusive state bureaucracies backed with legal powers or the imposition of 
moral standards based on religion – but by structuring the actions of people in which they 
govern themselves through their freedoms (Foucault, 1991). People are not merely free 
to choose, but are obliged to be free. 
Liberal strategies of government thus becomes dependent upon devices 
(schooling, the domesticated family, the lunatic asylum, the reformatory 
prison) that promise to create individuals who do not need to be governed 
by others, but will govern themselves, master themselves, care for 
themselves (Rose, 1996: 45).  
 
Administrators draw upon the tactics of the political economy which dynamic with the 
individual through a displacement from formal to informal techniques. Foucault (1994) 
describes multi-form tactics within governmentality as “the ensemble of institutions, 
procedures, and analysis that allow the exercise” of state power over its populations 
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(Foucault 1994:219). Examples of these tactics are state sponsored education, health 
care, and emergency services like, police services and the fire department. These tactics 
ensure the greatest possible wealth and opportunity for the population to succeed and 
multiply according to rules of the political economy. For example, the government will 
launch campaigns to improve health or redistribute populations through vaccination 
promotions or immigration policy. Rather than imposing law, the government encourages 
compliance through a tactic that will promote wealth and the goals of government. 
The individual and the family were to be ‘simultaneously assigned their social 
duties, accorded their right, assured of their natural capacities, and educated 
in the fact that they need to be educated by experts in order to responsibly 
assume their freedom (Rose 1996: 49). 
 
State strategies, freedom, the population, politics, and the economy do not function 
separately from each other; instead, these efforts function as tactics of government 
(supporting specific neo-liberal goals) shared by both government and its population 
(Rose, 1996; Foucault, 1991). The technologies and tactics of government must be aligned 
with individual goals by replacing the model of the family with the political economy. The 
practice of the political economy becomes a question of “how to introduce this 
meticulous attention of the father towards his family into the management of the state” 
(Foucault, 1991:92). As a segment of government, the family is no longer a model of 
governing and is absorbed into the political economy. Population statistics made possible 
the refocusing of governments from the problems of the family to the political economy 
(Foucault, 1991). For example, the State, with the appropriate statistics, will facilitate the 
management of goods, wealth, and health so that the population will prosper through tax 
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credit bonuses, public education, and health initiatives that can promote birthrates and 
reduce mortality. The family becomes a normalizing force in the support of a neo-liberal 
political economy. 
Governmentality: Individual Freedom and the Technology of Self 
 Through individual freedom, self-governing capabilities can be instilled in order to 
bring personal conduct and self evaluation in line with political objectives (Rose, 1999; 
1996). These capabilities are based on the political economy’s principles of enterprise and 
autonomy. Enterprise here designates rules for conduct that include initiative, ambition, 
and personal responsibility. Thus, the enterprising, autonomous self seeks to maximize 
social capital as an active agent in order to better oneself (Rose, 1999; 1996). In advanced 
liberal democracies, the control of populations is not the end of political power, but one 
of the objectives and instruments of facilitating the “conduct of conducts” through the 
political economy (Foucault, 1991; Garland, 1997; Garland, 1996; Rose, 1999; 1996). 
The technologies of the self are particular tactics where individuals are 
encouraged to become free, enterprising individuals who govern themselves and need 
only limited direct supervision by the state. The implementation of these technologies are 
greatly assisted by experts from the social sciences. These experts operate a regime of 
the self, where success in life depends on a continual exercise of freedom and where life 
is understood, not in terms of fate or social status (welfare strategies), but in terms of 
individual success or failure in acquiring the skills and making the choices to actualize 
oneself (Rose, 1999; 1996). For example, if individuals engage in self improvement 
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programs, they are engaged in self government by following the expertise of help 
professionals. Depending on why individuals engage in self improvement, they may look 
to improve their quality of life, improve relationships, or ‘move up the food chain’; 
individuals participate in these efforts for specific reasons underpinned by technologies of 
the self and the political economy.  
Self -help individuals seek to work upon the person they hope to become, by 
taking the responsibility to do so. The motivations for self care are supported by the 
government which seeks to transform the population into free, enterprising, autonomous 
neo-liberal individuals. The technology of self through economic consumption and 
participation in the political economy utilizes the power of goods to shape identities 
(Rose, 1999; 1996). The strategy of establishing individuals, families, and communities as 
responsible entails shifting the responsibility for preventing and responding to illness, 
unemployment, and crime to the individual through strategies of self care by encouraging 
people to be both morally responsible and economically rational (Rose, 1999; Garland, 
1996; O’Malley, 1996). 
The relations of power once understood in terms of war, struggle, and conflict as a 
sovereign state strategy are now positioned as relationships with legitimation, will, and 
consensus. Foucault’s earlier work on discipline and punishment, while not in 
contradiction with governmentality, relied too heavily on sovereign state strategies 
without a consideration of willing participation on the part of the population (Foucault, 
1991). Foucault made this correction in response to criticisms of theoretical reductionism 
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by positioning governmentality between the technology of self and the state’s use of 
domination (Habermas, 1990). Government does not dominate; it works foremost as a 
“conduct of conducts” ranging from “governing the self” to “governing others” (Foucault, 
1982:208-226). 
It is this interaction of the technologies of science, surveillance and language that 
defines government as the governing of the self (i.e. agency) to the governing of others 
for political and economic ends (Foucault, 1988). Hence, government signifies problems 
of self-control, guidance for the family, and the management of the household. To 
analyze government is to analyze those mechanisms that try to shape and work through 
the choices, wants, and lifestyles of individuals (Rose, 1996). 
From feudal to modern times – from discipline to responsibilization –– deviance 
designations have been created by experts in hospitals, prisons, and schools. These 
designations are connected to governmentalities that have classified deviants, such as 
witches, throwbacks, mentally ill, and (ir)responsible individuals. Shifts from sovereign 
state to neo-liberal strategies and changes in the explanation of deviance are not linear 
developments in history, but result, in part, from the accumulation of expert knowledge 
by some and the subjugation of others by that knowledge. Historically, the expert has 
been employed by government to identify, discipline, and control those deemed deviant. 
Despite their best efforts, sovereign and welfare state strategies have failed to prevent 
crime and have been replaced by neo-liberal multi-form tactics that have displaced the 
responsibility to prevent and respond to social ills to the people. The technology of 
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domination and self serves to support neo-liberal government goals by obliging 
individuals to embrace their freedoms and fulfill expectations. Responsible individuals 
and the goals of the political economy are mutually shared. State tactics of domination 
and control are reserved for those who fail to achieve a responsible status – the others.  
According to Garland (1996), two types of criminology explain this domination of 
self and the role of the other; the criminology of the self, which describes criminals as 
rational actors, and the criminology of the other, which describes the criminal as “the 
threatening outcast, the fearsome stranger, the excluded and the embittered” (Garland, 
1996: 461). The criminology of the self depicts crime as normal, routine, and that 
criminals are to be regarded as rational (i.e. white collar crime, crimes against the 
environment). The criminology of the other justifies punitive state responses. “One is 
invoked to routinize crime, to allay disproportionate fears, and to promote preventative 
action. The other is concerned to demonize the criminal, to excite popular fears and 
hostilities, and to promote support for state punishment” (Garland, 1996:461). The 
Robert Pickton murders in British Columbia from 2001-2006 highlight the complex 
relationship between the responsible self and the political economy. 
Sex trade workers started going missing from Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside as 
early as 1978. Jiwani and Young (2006) suggested that early news articles suggested a 
serial killer was responsible. Yet, Vancouver Police Constable and media liaison officer 
Anne Drennan stated “no indication that a serial killer is preying on women. Detectives 
also have to investigate the possibility of a suicide or drug overdose that has gone 
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undiscovered, or that the women were killed in a dispute over drugs” (Vancouver Sun July 
3rd, 1998). The missing women were described by police as drug addicted, Aboriginal, sex 
trade workers who existed in the margins of a street entrenched lifestyle. As 
disenfranchised individuals, they were difficult to find and social responsibility for their 
victimization could be avoided because of their status as sex trade workers. These women 
were themselves part of the criminalized class. 
Virtually all our social and political institutions are guilty of marginalizing 
‘junkies’ and ‘whores.’ And all our institutions – the police most particularly, 
where these disappeared women are concerned – must never forget that 
every human life really matters (Vancouver Sun September 16, 2003). 
Regardless, the early stages of the investigation was “assigned to inexperienced and 
overworked officers without the time or resources to do a thorough job” (Jiwani and 
Young, 2006:903). Despite the growing number of missing women, little attention was 
paid by police until a “respectable” community developed between journalists, activists, 
and family members of the missing women demanded police action (Jiwani and Young, 
2006). The media also began depicting the missing women as mothers, daughters, and 
sisters. By normalizing the victim, the public could relate to these women and support 
police efforts and rising investigation costs. The systemic, Downtown Eastside, social 
problems of drug addiction, abuse, and the sex trade could be re-framed by depictions of 
these women as connected to legitimate communities (Jiwani and Young, 2006). Now, 
with a credible victim, the offender is targeted. 
Robert Pickton was depicted in the media as the ultimate predator with his “wild, 
stringy hair and a blank stare” (Vancouver Sun July 3rd 1998). Embracing a hillbilly culture, 
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Pickton hosted “Piggy Palace Good Times” parties that featured sex trade workers being 
drugged, tortured, and killed. Representations of Pickton focused on his mental health, 
ignoring the wider social, economic, and political conditions that created the 
opportunities for these crimes. The public was brought into the crisis when Pickton was 
accused of selling pigs that had consumed the remains of sex trade workers.   
The horror with which the consumption of human remains via the meat 
taken from the Pickton farm suggests that this act was considered more 
horrible than the actual murders of the women themselves. That they were 
murdered was probable and logical given what the paper described 
subsequently as their “high risk” lifestyles. But that their remains might be 
consumed by innocent others – notably the public – was considered more 
horrific (Jiwani and Young, 2006: 909). 
 
Long after Pickton was arrested and tried, the entrenched social problems of Downtown 
Eastside remained to exist and sex trade workers remain marginalized and vulnerable.  
That so many prostitutes have gone missing suggests the system is broken. 
And what’s more, it’s flawed from the top to bottom: From laws governing 
prostitution, to social services available for prostitutes, to our attitude 
toward people who work or live on the street (Vancouver Sun September 
16th 2003). 
 
Public policy development is a value-laden process in which policy makers react (or not) 
to social conditions. Power relations, struggles, and inequalities between citizens, experts, 
and political authorities mean that public policy itself is never neutral. Social problems are 
not part of an objective reality waiting to be discovered. Rather, problem recognition is a 
socially constructed process that involves definitions of madness and crime. Once issues 
become interpreted as public problems by government, deeper questions are raised 
about the social construction of that knowledge.  
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In summary, the science of criminology and its original reliance on positivistic 
method has, in part, determined its present role in criminal justice public policy to 
identify, target, and risk-assess offenders for punishment and treatment. Positivistic value 
free method fails to account for value laden applications of science in criminology. The 
structure of science is reduced to a rigid meta-language that does not appreciate the 
importance of people as active agents while exalting the role of the expert. Further, the 
relationship between technology, social control, and power reduces the agent to rely on 
experts. 
Governments, employing experts, are involved in a complex, interactive process 
that works to restructure attitudes in line with the neo-liberal political rational economy. 
Truth becomes a convenient end where power is decentralized by science, surveillance, 
and language and people play an active role in their own self-government. These rules of 
domination ensure a maximum economy by redefining what is public versus what is 
private. Substantive inequalities are abstracted to justify individual accountability. The 
individual, family, and community become responsible for solving complex social 
problems that were once the jurisdiction of government welfare strategies. This neo-
liberal shift from formal to informal techniques means that people must responsibly 
assume their freedom. Expressions of enterprise and autonomy are celebrated, while 
those who fail to achieve their individual freedom in line with political objectives will be 
subjected to public policy. 
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Chapter 3: Lawmaking and Lawbreaking: Deviance as Public 
Policy - A Definition 
 
Examining public policy will further highlight how deviance is socially constructed 
to serve the needs of government at particular times in history. The examples of 
midwifery, prostitution, and youth crime will highlight how problems get framed and 
responsibility determined. Public policy can be defined as a system of laws, regulatory 
measures, courses of action (or inaction), and funding priorities addressing a given issue 
by government (Peters, 2004; Pal, 2001). Simply put, public policy is “whatever 
governments choose to do or not to do” (Dye, 1972: 18). Governments approach social 
problems with a broad framework of ideas and values when determining their preferred 
course of action (Brooks, 1989). Therefore, public policy is a choice or decision made by 
government that guides subsequent actions in similar circumstances. The course of action 
for public policy development (policy cycle) includes problem recognition, solution 
consideration, implementation, and evaluation (Peters, 2004; Pal, 2001; Howlett and 
Ramesh, 2003). Inherent in the policy cycle is the notion that governments have the 
power to respond (or not) to problems with solutions (Jerkins, 1978). Power relations, 
struggles, and inequalities between citizens, experts, and political authorities mean that 
public policy itself is not neutral. National and international interests, party and individual 
politics, as well as values influence what issues get defined as problems worthy of a policy 
agenda and solution (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003).  
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A critical point of the policy cycle is the recognition and definition of a social 
problem that requires an intervention on the part of government. Defining an issue as a 
social problem requires an historical understanding of that issue. 
Problems come into discourse and therefore into existence as 
reinforcements of ideologies, not simply because they are there or because 
they are important for well-being. They signify who are virtuous and useful 
and who are dangerous and inadequate, which actions will be rewarded and 
which will be penalized (Edelman, 1988: 12-13). 
 
The identification of problems by government will often involve criminologists framing 
the parameters of the problem, while suggesting solutions that are compatible with the 
goals of government (Garland, 1996; 1997). The research of criminologists often supports 
political agendas and ideologies and is also not value neutral (Bendle, 1999). Therefore, 
the idea that public policy is a process in which policy makers react to objective 
conditions in a rational manner is deceptive if not completely misleading (Foucault, 1982). 
Once issues become interpreted as public problems by government, it raises deeper 
questions about the social construction of that knowledge (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003).  
 Criminologists assist the policy development process by identifying, targeting, or 
risk-assessing offenders for punishment and treatment (Squires and Measor, 2005). 
Rarely is there government funding or “encouragement for projects that consider crime in 
terms of broader social or economic policy, or which examine closely the quality of justice 
distributed by criminal justice decision makers” (Squires and Measor, 2005: 29).  The 
work of criminologists allows the government to assign responsibility to appropriate 
policy ‘fixers’ of the problem. ‘Fixers’ apply policy tools to those defined as deviant who 
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“will have to stop an activity, do it differently, compensate its victims, or possibly face 
punishment” (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 127-128). Not only is the work of criminologists 
tied to the recognition and definition of a social problem, it becomes a tool, instrument, 
and resource for government when solving the social problem. 
 Every policy instrument constitutes a condensed form of knowledge about social 
control and the ways of exercising that social control. The instruments at work are not 
neutral devices, but they produce specific effects, like increased taxation or government 
spending (Foucault, 1991). To establish an overall context, policy instruments can be 
placed along a continuum based on the practical relationship of the policy to people. 
Then, individual choice or level of government action or inaction determines the location 
of a policy instrument in relation to the continuum. The continuum, based on the work of 
Doern and Phidd (1983), as modified by Howlett (1991) suggests that in a liberal 
democratic society, governments generally start with the least coercive instruments and 
move to the right side of the continuum only if compliance is not being achieved. 
Instruments can influence the way actors behave, often privileging certain actors and 
interests, while excluding others (Garland, 1997). In practice, public policy constrains and 
enables while advancing expert knowledge of problems through advisory committees, 
conferences, and research grants. Inherent in policy instruments is the relationship 
between subjects and objects (agency and constraint), as well as the expert knowledge 
that the policy relies upon. This relationship between knowledge, deviance designations, 
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and public policy is evident in the examples of the government’s approach to prostitution, 
midwifery, and youth crime. 
  
FIGURE 1: A CONTINUUM OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
Private Behaviour  Persuasion Expenditure  Regulation Public Ownership 
self-regulation  speeches  programs, grants  taxes  crown corporations 
stewardship  conferences subsidies   fines  mixed corporations 
voluntary   advisory  transfers   imprisonment 
compliance  committees market-based incentives 
 
Minimum <–––– (degree of legitimate state coercion) ––––> Maximum 
 
Prostitution 
 Kingsley Davis (1937) binds the analysis of prostitution to other sexual institutions 
including “the most respectable” marriage.  He argued that prostitution was the result of 
physical and social forces that demand its functional existence. Unattractive or 
unattached, men looking for sexual experiences outside of the legitimate institutions of 
marriage and courtship turn to prostitution as a function of their inherent sexual drives 
(Davis, 1937). “On the one hand, the demand is the result of a simple biological appetite. 
When all other sources of gratification fail, due to defects of person or circumstance, 
prostitution can be relied upon to furnish relief” (Davis 1937: 753). Davis (1937) asked 
“What, then, is the difference between prostitution and these other institutions involving 
sex?” The answer for Davis (1937) rested on moral judgements. 
 For Davis (1937), the first legitimate function of a sexual institution was the 
physical and social reproduction of the family. Having and raising children within the 
institution of marriage attracts the greatest support from law and the morally 
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respectable. This support was essential for Davis (1937) as it is these lines of control, both 
positive and negative, no matter the institutional system, that society requires to 
function. The sexual institution of engagement, marriage, and prostitution all provide 
pleasure; however, “they do not all tie it to the same social functions” and are thus 
evaluated differently (Davis, 1937: 746). For Davis (1937), although marriage may be 
based on various motives and functions that included sexual and economic, it was held in 
high esteem because of its role in procreation.  
Prostitution is drawn into an interdependence of individual motive and 
institutional function and thus controlled by society. For Davis (1937), the scale of 
approval for prostitution was not weighed equally for prostitute and client. Clients were 
referred to as otherwise “law abiding citizens” that, if targeted for prosecution, would 
disrupt the “vital institutional relationships – family, business, church, and state. Though 
the service is illegitimate, the citizen cannot be held guilty, for it is both impossible and 
inadvisable to punish half the populace for a crime” (Davis, 1937: 752). The street 
entrenched prostitute, already determined to be a social outcast, can serve her sentence 
without disrupting the organization and function of society. “No one misses her while she 
is serving out her turn – no one, at least, about whom society has any concern” (Flexner 
cited in Davis, 1937: 752). For Davis (1937), the demands for sexual variety, choice, and 
relief required by men entrench prostitution into society regardless of its political 
structure or economic organization. To punish men for availing themselves of prostitutes 
reflects a failure to understand the functional necessity of prostitution in society. It would 
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seem that public policy concerning prostitution has been framed in light of this 
functionalist perspective.  
Pam Cox (2003) pointed out that females, working as prostitutes in Canada, 
prompted diverse state interventions; incarceration, welfare actions (i.e. rescue) and neo-
liberal efforts towards regulation as “professionals” (i.e. responsibilization). For example, 
policies controlling prostitution prior to Confederation (1867) took the form of vagrancy 
laws designed to remove sex trade workers from the streets (McLaren, 1986). These early 
laws made the status of being a prostitute an offence. Further, disorderly conduct was 
not a requirement for prosecution and conviction. Once the status of ‘prostitute’ was 
determined, the deviance designation would be applied (McLaren, 1986). Madams and 
prostitutes alike were deemed criminals and subject to prosecution under the law. 
Prostitution was not officially opposed in port cities, such as Halifax; however, it was 
officially responded to by law enforcement when it was seen as a direct threat to 
“respectable” members of society (McLaren, 1986). Regardless, the focus of attention by 
the state during this early period of Canadian history was the prosecution of female 
prostitutes.  
After Confederation, Victorian reformers worked to abolish the “social evil” by 
punishing exploiters, in effect rescuing women and children from sexual exploitation 
(McLaren, 1986). In 1867, as part of an effort to ‘save’ women, it became a crime of 
“defilement” to purchase sex from a woman under 21 years. In 1869, males were subject 
to prosecution if found to be living on the avails of prostitution (McLaren, 1986). Although 
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the law existed to punish males involved in the purchase of sex, the reformers failed to 
change policing and enforcement practices. In fact, regardless of the new entries in the 
Criminal Code, no recorded convictions of “defilement”, “procuring”, or “keeping a bawdy 
house” existed (McLaren, 1986). Vagrancy convictions increased slightly after 1895 (the 
first year a gender breakdown is available) and the entries showed that more convictions 
were registered against women than men (McLaren, 1986). Thus, prostitution continued 
to function regardless of the failed Victorian welfare strategies. Despite the changes in 
law that allowed for the conviction of customers, the enforcement of this law was not 
practiced. Women working as prostitutes continued to be the target of governmental 
regulation.  
In Canada, the enforcement and regulation of prostitution continued to be a 
source of controversy. In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, the “respectable” public 
became concerned with prostitutes working in neighbourhoods. Spokespersons for 
citizens’ groups argued that prostitutes were responsible for neighbourhood decay and 
lobbied all levels of government to control the sex trade worker by strengthening the 
solicitation section of the Criminal Code (McGinnis, 1994). In sharp contrast, social 
reformers, feminist groups, and those working for the rights of prostitutes struggled for 
changes to the legal system that would improve the conditions of sex trade workers while 
targeting those clients that exploited or forced prostitutes into unwanted situations 
(McGinnis, 1994). Some reformers worked to change the law so sex trade workers, both 
male and female, could work in their industry without fear of criminal prosecution.  
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Sitoshi Ikeda (2006) stated that, since the 1980’s, there has been a push to define 
prostitution as a choice or an empowering act. For him, the free-market of neo-liberalism 
has been acting as a force behind recent efforts to legalize prostitution. “Legalized 
prostitution follows the neo-liberal logic that the market outcome is always best, 
regardless of social conditions” (cited in the University of Alberta, Express News. 
Bouchard, 2006). The state had failed to control prostitution through criminalization.  
In preparation for the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver, the British Columbia Coalition 
of Experiential Communities solicited support from politicians, including Vancouver East 
MP Libby Davies and former Vancouver Mayor Sam Sullivan, for brothels owned and run 
by sex-trade workers (Vancouver Sun November 12th, 2007). This co-op, the Coalition 
argued, would provide a valuable service to visiting tourists, while empowering 
prostitutes to manage their trade (Vancouver November 12th, 2007). As a neo-liberal 
strategy, sex trade workers would be responsible for the regulation of their profession. 
Unfortunately, research shows that “more than 90 % of women in the sex trade are not 
there by choice, but are part of the sex trade because of trafficking, drug addiction, and 
societal problems, such as incest” (Vancouver Sun November 12th, 2007). The struggle for 
legalization, therefore, negates the welfare of street entrenched women by focusing on 
the demands of the free market, advocating that prostitutes cooperatively run brothels 
for their clients.  
This process of problematization involves the shifting of social risks, which were 
once the responsibility of government, out of the public domain and into the domain 
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where the individual is responsible (Foucault, 1991). The neo-liberal stance on 
prostitution is to define the practice as external to the competency of the state by 
soliciting prostitutes themselves in the management of the risks in their trade.  
Regardless of the changing nature of regulation and enforcement, the theory 
advanced by Davis (1937) that prostitution serves a necessary function is not disrupted by 
changing political systems. In fact, Davis (1937) argued that: 
Not only did prostitution exist before capitalism arose, but capitalist 
countries themselves have frequently tried to stop private ownership of 
prostitutes for purposes of profit. They have consistently legislated against 
third parties – pimps, real estate owners, bookers – only to find that none of 
these measures succeed. In short, capitalism, like communism, has tried in 
the case of prostitution to negate the basic capitalistic principle (Davis, 1937: 
752). 
 
As Davis (1937) contended, the male demand for sexual relief will be accommodated by 
the supply of sex trade workers that will continue to be regulated by law. From a 
functionalist perspective, the legal regulation of prostitution in Canada allows sex trade 
workers to exist in the margins while they serve a valuable function for society.  
Midwifery  
Midwifery has a long history, is widely referenced across cultures, and some 
reactions to midwives constitute another example of the social construction of deviance. 
“Ancient Jews called her wise woman. In France she is sage-femme; in Germany, weise 
frau or Hebamme, mother’s adviser, helper, or friend; cum-mater in Latin; and comadre in 
Spanish and Portuguese. The English translation, midwife means ‘with women’ (Zeitz, 
2006:1). Historically, midwives were held in high regard and once solely responsible for 
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birthing. Without formal education or the support of church or state, these women 
worked amongst the poor. Their control of birthing was revered, feared, and often seen 
connected to mystical powers. Prior to the establishment of medical schools and 
advances in obstetrics, birthing was viewed as normal and natural and not a medical 
procedure that needed to be managed by medical men (Rich, 1976).  
Denied entry into medical schools, midwives were now seen as deviants who 
needed to be controlled. For example, in the 13th century, European secular medical 
schools were attended by upper class men who assumed control of childbirth (Romalis, 
1981). Rich (1976) stated that, at this point in the “paradigm shift,” the medical 
profession began to control healing, refusing to acknowledge the healing powers of 
women who worked for centuries among the poor. Further, these medical men were 
backed by the laws of the church which disapproved of female pagan healing practices. 
With paradigm shifts come new deviance designations. Achtenberg (1991) 
described the witch-hunts as the most heinous example of unfettered church and state 
authority. The burning of women was seen as a religious cleansing of deviants opposed to 
God and the State. Under this paradigm, midwives were re-constituted as deviants and 
subjected to torture, prosecution, and death (Achtenberg, 1991). Here, sovereign state 
strategies were implemented with harsh penalties for these “troublesome populations” 
engaged in what had previously been a normal practice. After the expertise of childbirth 
had been constituted by medical men, childbirth became the internal domain of the state 
until recent  midwives advocated for a re-definition. 
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Legal challenges by recent midwives to the entrenched medical system have led to 
the development and implementation of midwifery legislation in British Columbia, 
Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario, but not in New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island. 
These latter jurisdictions are awaiting regulation approval (The Canadian Midwifery 
Regulators Consortium, 2009). While legal in most provinces in Canada, all midwives must 
have the informed consent of their clients and be registered with a quasi-governmental 
body that determines the competencies of midwives, and monitors and enforces 
midwifery legislation to ensure the protection of the public (The Canadian Midwifery 
Regulators Consortium, 2007). The regulatory state constructs midwifery differently than 
the sovereign state. For example, midwives are no longer subject to witch-burning trials 
but instead administrative regulations that set professional standards for the practice. 
Contemporary midwives struggle to survive by aligning their practice to 
conventional (medical) regulatory institutions, like the college of midwives. Burtch (1992) 
outlined that the social transformation of legalizing midwifery has had the pressing and 
continued effect of slotting midwives into “neutralized” positions of nursing, which allows 
midwives to help doctors, but not compete with them. Burtch suggested that the efforts 
to legalize midwifery have been difficult because the “Law operates in a dialectical way, 
embedding ‘real rights’ for individuals, but within a dominant ideology of medical and 
state control” (Burtch, 1992: 165). “Quebec midwife Céline Lemay, for example, cautions 
that the incorporation of midwifery within mainstream healthcare threatens its 
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‘emancipatory’ agenda because of the dominant consumerist, neo-liberal discourse of 
choice” (Spoel, 2004: 13).  
From the harsh penalties of the sovereign state to the management of midwifery 
through neo-liberal governmental regulation, midwives, as a “troublesome population”, 
have been co-opted by the medical establishment. Midwifery has been brought into the 
system of government regulations and systematically controlled to serve the needs of 
government, while also appeasing the nurses. Thus, according to Foucault (1982), 
governmentality (and its relationship to power/tactics) includes “consensual” forms of 
participation by people. It signifies that coercion or consensus are reformulated as means 
of managing troublesome populations. Foucault (1993) explained: 
I think if one wants to analyze the genealogy of the subject in Western 
Civilization, he has to take into account the interaction between those two 
types of techniques – techniques of domination and techniques of self. He 
has to take into account the points where the technologies of domination 
of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the 
individual acts upon himself. And conversely, he has to take into account 
the points where the techniques of the self are integrated into structures 
of coercion and domination. The contact point, where the individuals are 
driven by others is tied to the way they conduct themselves, is what we 
call, I think government. Governing people, in the broad meaning of the 
word, is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is 
always a versatile equilibrium, with complementary and conflicts between 
techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is 
constructed or modified by himself (Foucault, 1993: 203-204). 
 
The midwife exists within the context of a legitimate system of control and must 
contribute to that control for survival. Once the practice of midwifery was marginalized as 
an historical event, the practice could be reconstituted within the goals of government. 
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Youth Crime: Punishment, Control, and Responsibilization 
 Throughout history, youth defined as deviant have been subjected to state 
responses that have moved from government sovereign state strategies to government 
welfare interventions. In Canada, child offenders were given the same harsh sovereign 
state penalties as adults (Griffiths, 1989). As stated in recorded documents, from as late 
as 1888, children were not distinct from adults in prison. For example, in Dorchester 
Penitentiary, 13 year old Herbert Smith received five years for breaking and entering 
(Griffiths, 1989). Examples like this were also common in Kingston Penitentiary where, 
following its completion in 1835, children were confined with adults regardless of their 
age, prior record, or severity of offence. The 1849 Brown Commission confirmed that 
Kingston Penitentiary used excessive corporal punishment (sovereign state strategies) on 
child inmates and recommended alternative forms of humanitarian (welfare state) 
controls (Griffiths, 1989). 
 The suggestions and recommendations made by the Commission (as well as other 
active child saving interest groups) resulted in the construction of institutions which 
worked to “kindly” control society’s youth. Griffiths (1989) stated that, at the time, 
institutionalizing children was considered a means of improving society by temporarily 
exposing them to an environment superior to that of their homes (a tactic of the political 
economy). This view of superior home and family reflected an approach to government 
based on welfare principles that viewed youth deviance as a social problem that the state 
could solve. 
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 Reformers such as Egerton Ryerson, father of the Ontario Public School system, 
saw the benefits of organized state intervention as an active part of advancing family 
relations. In 1908, the Juvenile Delinquents’ Act (JDA) created delinquency as a specific 
legal entity in Canada primarily concerned with the social welfare of children. As Griffiths 
(1989) argued, the legislation represented the blending of juvenile justice and child 
welfare systems. The welfare model (at the foundation of the JDA 1908) reduced juvenile 
delinquency to a social problem. “The welfare model as an ideal type emphasized the 
importance of social background and the related lack of responsibility for one’s 
behaviour” (Corrado, 1983: 11). The objective of the JDA (1908) was to rehabilitate and 
reform, not to punish. Young people who broke the law were found to be in a state of 
delinquency, not convicted of a crime and considered criminal. The JDA 1908 stated that 
“every juvenile delinquent shall be treated, not as a criminal, but as a misdirected and 
misguided child” (JDA 1908). Delinquent youth were viewed as victims of poverty, abuse, 
neglect, and their parents’ failure to raise them well.  It was argued that the state should 
assume custody of their child (Corrado, 1983). The preamble to the JDA (1908) stated that 
delinquents should: 
Be guarded against associations with crime and criminals, and should be 
subjected to such wise care, treatment and control as will tend to check their 
evil tendencies and strengthen their better instincts (JDA, 1908: Preamble).  
 
The definition of “delinquency” was so broad that youth could be adjudicated for 
breaking minor laws, including truancy, coming home late, or loitering (Corrado, 1983). 
The welfare model presupposed that the state should intervene in a caring and kind 
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manner in the best interests of the child. Several themes were identified throughout the 
history of the JDA: the lack of procedural rules in the adjudication structure; vague 
legislation; and, the power dispute between the traditional controllers of deviance 
designations, police, and aspiring controllers, psychiatrists, and social workers (Corrado, 
1983). The outcome of this dispute resulted in the child savers (psychiatrists/social 
workers) partially separating the juvenile system from the adversarial legal system by 
making it part of the administrative child welfare system (Griffiths, 1989). Criticized for a 
lack of procedural rights and inconsistent dispositions for delinquency, the JDA (1908) 
was replaced in 1984 by the Young Offenders Act (YOA), but not before expanding the 
jurisdiction of youth crime to include experts and agencies outside the conventional 
criminal justice system, such as social workers and rehabilitation professionals concerned 
with community based diversion programs. With the tactics and tools available to 
government to fix the youth crime problem, expanded new legislation was introduced. 
The YOA (1984) received royal assent in 1982, but was not proclaimed in force 
until April 1984. There was intense debate about whether the YOA (1984) should be 
premised on the welfare model (parens patriae), crime control, or a justice model (due 
process) (Griffiths, 1989). The YOA (1984) adopted what is known as the “justice” model 
of juvenile criminal justice. Ultimately, the YOA (1984) recognized the special needs and 
vulnerability of youth (i.e. welfare), but also placed emphasis on both protection of the 
public and the rights of young people (YOA, 1984). The emphasis was less on social 
intervention, but more on the delineation of rights and obligations. The result was a 
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detailed YOA (1984) which governed the criminal proceeding against youth resulting in an 
expanded role for lawyers (Griffiths, 1989). With the new legislation, violent youth crime 
climbed steadily throughout the 1980s (Source Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, June 
2001). Further, public opinion polls consistently showed that the public’s perception of 
the YOA (1984) was that it contributed to high crime rates (Griffiths, 1989). Thus, the 
state had failed to reduce youth crime.  The time had come for a neo-liberal supported 
Youth Criminal Justice Act (2003) (YCJA) focused on responsibility, accountability, and 
neo-liberal state strategies of community involvement in responding to youth crime. 
The Youth Criminal Justice Act (2003) (YCJA) directed that “communities and 
families should work in partnership with others to prevent youth crime by addressing 
underlying causes, responding to the needs of young persons, providing guidance and 
support while holding young people responsible for their behaviours” (YCJA, 2003). The 
Preamble of the YCJA (2003) contains statements from Parliament about the values on 
which the legislation was based. These statements can be used to help interpret the 
legislation. For example, from the Preamble: 
Whereas communities, families, parents, and others concerned with the 
development of young persons should, through multi-disciplinary 
approaches, take reasonable steps to prevent youth crime by addressing its 
underlying causes, to respond to the needs of young persons, and to provide 
guidance and support to those at risk of committing crimes (YCJA, 1984: 
Preamble). 
 
The YCJA (2003) represented an attempt to reverse the YOA (1984) fostered 
criminalization/incarceration practices through the facilitation of broad based 
preventative efforts that went “beyond the justice system to explore how society as a 
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whole can address youth crime and its associated factors” (Canada, Department of Justice 
2003). The federal government called upon established and emerging “partners” across 
sectors to participate in “multidisciplinary approaches” that addressed the “underlying 
causes” of youth offending and re-offending so as to promote “the long-term protection 
of the public”(YCJA, 2003 Preamble and s. 38). The shifting of responsibility from 
governments to individuals, families, and communities created a standard where 
responsibility itself becomes a social construction. 
Although “partners” and “partnering” are not explicitly defined in the YCJA (2003), 
these directives provide some direction of those involved. First, “partners” refers to all 
individuals and/or agencies that have a shared responsibility in preventing crime, 
including the family, the community, and the youth themselves (Canada, Department of 
Justice, 2003). Second, “partners” refers to existing and potential crime prevention 
networks, including non-profit agencies. It is intended that this wide range of partners 
shares and implement “long-lasting solutions to preventing and dealing with youth 
crime”, ideally, but not exclusively, through “inter-sectorial, collaborative, 
multidisciplinary, and integrated programs and services” (Canada, Department of Justice, 
2003). Third, “partners” refers to funding, especially provincial, territorial, and municipal 
levels of government, as well as funders from the private sector (Canada, Department of 
Justice, 2003). David Garland (2000) was among those who characterized partnering 
strategies as inherently problematic, requiring the formation of hybrid organizations 
which blurred public and private boundaries. With the capillaries of control expanded, 
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governments have now extended the responsibility of addressing youth crime to the 
community.  
Informed by Foucault, Garland (2000) argued that competing, contradictory, 
contested knowledge, interests, and actors shape government strategies and their 
implementation in the present moment. The neo-liberal strategy of transferring once 
state responsibilities of child welfare to the community has downloaded responsibility to 
the family, the community, as well as the youth themselves for preventing and 
responding to youth crime. This strategy is not a reduction of state involvement, but an 
expansion of the goal of crime prevention and control to the population through 
responsibilization. 
Responsibility is a key construct in the YCJA (2003). The federal government 
stressed that it alone cannot prevent crime and “members of society share a 
responsibility ... [and should] take reasonable steps to prevent youth crime by addressing 
its underlying causes” (YCJA, Preamble). Scholars call this “responsibilizing” strategy, “at-
a-distance” governance (Garland, 2000; Rose, 1996). This approach offers and calls forth a 
whole new infrastructure that diffuses lines of accountability and places blame for 
failures of responsibility on the subjects of governance – the youth themselves (Garland, 
2000). Youth must meet their responsibility as partners in crime control and those who 
refuse or fail to be “responsibilized” effectively choose their own marginalization and 
exclusion (Rose, 1996, 2000; Bittle, 2002; Garland, 1997). 
(i)n place of society are individuals, families, ‘the market’, and voluntary 
associations; in place of social forces are individual enterprise and 
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community initiatives, in place of social services and security there are 
individual practices of prudence, foresight, competence, responsibility, and 
enterprise (O’Malley, 1996:28). 
 
In line with its desire to reduce the scope of government, neo-liberal proponents develop 
indirect techniques for managing people without being responsible for them (Lemke, 
2001). Through responsibilization, social risks like illness, poverty, and crime are not 
within the domain of the state, but in the domain of the individual (Lemke, 2001). 
Responsibilization strategies become the norm and are aligned with political goals. For 
example, individuals must work to achieve normality by controlling their impulses with 
the help of experts to avoid shame (Rose, 1999). Thus, complex social problems the state 
could not solve under the JDA (1908), the YOA (1984), and the YCJA (2003) are now the 
personal responsibility of the public. The reconstructing of responsibility means that the 
accountability for deviance is constructed differently. 
Cruikshank (1996) argued that self-esteem is a technology (specialized knowledge) 
to estimate, discipline, and judge ourselves. Self-esteem has more to do with self 
assessment than self respect, as the self continuously has to be measured, judged, and 
disciplined (against the collective yardstick) in order to achieve personal ‘empowerment’ 
(Cruikshank, 1996). The yardstick is constructed by neo-liberal governments based on 
individual responsibility – negating the former reality of collective responsibility to 
prevent social problems. The example of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) 
in children highlights the accumulation of expert knowledge, the importance of normality, 
and the emphasis placed on personal responsibility to avoid shame. 
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In spite of no clear organic cause, hyperactivity (later ADHD) was categorized in 
1957 as minimal brain injury (Conrad, 1975). Not much knowledge was collected, as over 
three dozen articles appeared in scientific journals between 1957 and 1960. Yet, 20 years 
later, from 1977 to 1980, over 7,000 articles were published (Moghadam, 1988). Today, 
the organic etiology of ADHD is also assumed, and no “proof” exists that hyperactivity is 
organically caused (Barkely, 2006). Two elements contributed to the heightened 
awareness of ADHD:first, the changing nature of governmentality that included 
psychiatry/psychology as a tactic for responding to childhood deviance;and second, the 
pharmaceutical revolution. 
 Conrad (1975) argued that the pharmaceutical revolution in mental health and the 
increased interest in child psychiatry have provided the background for the accumulation 
of knowledge regarding ADHD (Conrad, 1975). Specifically, the pharmaceutical industry 
had been synthesizing and manufacturing a large number of psychoactive drugs, such as 
Benzedrine, Ritalin, and Dexedrine. Although these drugs were not originally marketed 
for use with children, manufacturers began to advertise for that purpose. For instance, 
CIBA, the maker of Ritalin, directed advertising at education and 
psychologists/psychiatrists (Conrad, 1975). Thus, based on the limited work of Bradley in 
1937, which originally discovered that amphetamine drugs subdued the disruptive child, 
and the marketing by pharmaceutical companies, doctors were encouraged to prescribe 
treatment. Conrad (1975) noted a paradox that the treatment for ADHD existed long 
before the disorder had been conceptualized. Foucault may have argued that no paradox 
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exists; that once the knowledge of the cure was discovered, the appropriate subjects 
would be targeted for its use. The example of ADHD suggests that governments are not 
designating deviance completely as an individual responsibility, but are still looking for 
causes, such as biology, where governments can intervene with medication. Once this 
shift in the social construction takes place, families are designated as being responsible 
for accessing medications for this “troublesome population”. 
 With the technology of the cure, disruptive, disobedient, and overactive children 
could be identified for treatment. Questions regarding the structure of education or the 
social conditions of youth are ignored. Waltzkin (1989) argued that contextual sources of 
human distress, such as class structure, the organization of school, family life, gender 
roles, and sexuality must be excluded from the diagnosis in order to expand the control of 
deviants beyond the criminal justice system. For example, rather than focusing on 
changing the social structure (i.e. social inequalities that lead to medicalized deviance and 
social control), methods are provided that categorize behaviour within the context of 
biology which further entrenches empirical “laws” (Waltzkin, 1989). Youth who disrupt 
the classroom are people who are sick. The problem of ADHD is found in the child; now 
labeled ill. Experts mandate that parents are responsible for seeking treatment for their 
children who suffer from a low self-esteem due to the failures caused by disturbed 
attention, impulsive behavior, and rejection by classmates and teachers (Waltzkin, 1989). 
Beyond school based problems, many of these affected youth become young offenders, 
with 30% to 70% of delinquent youth experiencing learning problems like ADHD 
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(Gudjonsson, et al., 2008; Koopman, 1983; Crealock, 1987). Overall, the pharmaceutical 
revolution relates to socially constructed governance and responsibility. The government 
continues to regulate deviance while displacing specific responsibilities to the private 
sector. Individuals and families become responsible to seek the advice of experts based 
on regulations. 
Once a social problem has been identified by government, the appropriate public 
policy is created. Yet, the problem recognition process is not value neutral and the 
policies and practices that are prescribed by government are value laden. The expert will 
establish a cause/function of the social problem and, based on knowledge, lawmakers 
and law enforcers will target a particular group or set of behaviours. Rather than 
examining the deeper questions about the knowledge that identified “troublesome 
populations”, governments look to solve the social problem by applying policy tools that 
incarcerate, punish, and hold deviants and their families responsible. Previously, 
offenders were constructed as sick and welfare state governments took responsibility for 
them. Currently, when offenders are constructed as sick, the affected individuals, their 
families, and communities are positioned by the new social construction of deviance 
response to take responsibility for them (Rose, 1996). 
In summary, sex trade workers, midwives, and young offenders are subject to the 
evaluations of experts and the public policy tools and tactics of government. These 
people have been subjected to incarceration, harsh punishment, and even death, while 
current liberal practice holds responsible or co-opt these individuals into the solution of 
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the social problem so that the goals of government can be maintained. The deviant label, 
the policy, and the practice of responders are socially constructed and change, depending 
on the needs of government. To avoid displacing complex social problems back on those 
defined as its cause, the questions of knowledge construction must be examined.6 
Alternative approaches would focus on systemic social problems that create and 
perpetuate crime as well as the social responsibility of government, rather than individual 
blame and accountability. 
                                                 
6
 The example of Aboriginal residential schools in Canada helps to understand the importance of considering 
alternative approaches to social problems. From 1879 to 1986, Aboriginal children were involuntarily 
removed from reservations in a government sponsored attempt to educate and acculturate them into a 
modern, mainstream society – “civilize the savages” (Milloy, 1999). The federal Department of Indian and 
Northern Affairs implemented the government‟s policy of “aggressive assimilation” which was implemented 
by church-run industrial school educators. While at the residential school, Aboriginal children were denied 
the ability to speak native languages or practice native beliefs. They could write letters to their family in 
English only which furthered the divide between the child and the community as many of the parents could 
not speak English. If school rules were violated, children were subjected to harsh punishments (Milloy, 1999). 
Eventually, children were released back to the reservation that had now been dismantled and fraught with 
problems of abuse, alcohol addiction, and crime. Yet, the government was looking to create a capacity where 
Aboriginal communities are responsible for their own self government (Charlottetown Agreement and 
Aboriginal Self Government, 1992). Stripping a community‟s ability to serve its people (with the reliance of 
experts working for government) and then tasking it with the responsibility to solve complex social problems 
of crime and poverty necessitates the examination of alternative responses to socially- constructed deviance. 
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Chapter 4: Bridging the Gap between Structure and Agency 
 
Deviance designations are intimately connected to theoretical paradigms. 
Advocates of sacred theories call deviance witchcraft, positivistic theorists call deviance 
atavism, and psychiatric theorists call deviance mental illness. Paradigmatic shifts and 
changes in the explanations for deviance are not the result of linear developments in 
human knowledge, but result, in part, from the accumulation and subjugation of 
knowledge. The scientific method supports experts. In turn, the jurisdiction of the expert 
transcends public policy in controlling behaviour. Thus, human experience and practice 
become separated from the objectified work of the legitimized controllers. Yet, inherent 
contradictions are produced from this power/knowledge relationship. Technologies, then, 
both liberate and limit human action. Resistance within the ideology of a paradigm is 
difficult because social control is exercised in several ways. Nevertheless, contradictions 
can be exposed, analyzed, and dissembled. 
Specific historical changes are central to an analysis of deviance and social control 
in public policy. Changes in the definition of deviance, from normal to bad to sick, cannot 
be viewed as linear developments. Rather, they should be considered as socially 
constructed categories. The western worldview of deviance is supplemented by the 
expanding jurisdiction of the expert reliant on specific forms of technical, objective, 
positivistic knowledge. While the structural analysis of positivism is necessary, as well as a 
discussion of the supporting social policy and social control, the consequences of socially 
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constructed deviance and social control would not be complete without looking at the 
gaps and inconsistencies in knowledge (or the role of the subject). The positivistic 
objective framework has had the intended and unintended effect of curing disease, 
controlling behaviour, and improving health. However, once knowledge is accumulated, it 
is also separated from human experience and practice (agency). The work of Marx, 
Foucault, Gadamer, and Giddens focused on the relationship of structure and agency in 
the social construction of knowledge. 
To outline Marxist ideology, it is important to realize Marx was a child of the 
Enlightenment. Yet, Marx himself surpassed the new scientific rationality or mechanical 
materialism by integrating currents from reality with the philosophy of consciousness. To 
integrate these currents, Marx suggested they both had a common origin. Hence, 
although reality and consciousness are heterogeneous, they are both historically specific 
(the historically specific nature of these elements helps dispel the myth that subject and 
object are mutually exclusive). Marx attempted to end the dualism that polarized subject 
and object (Marx and Engels, 1932; Larrain, 1979). 
Examples of this polarization can be seen in the materialist view that 
consciousness is merely a reflection of social existence (reality), while idealism sees social 
reality as a product of consciousness. In either case, reality and consciousness remain 
mutually exclusive. Marx conceptualized a unity where materialism split and idealism 
simply dissolved being into consciousness. Hence, Marx contended that consciousness 
was to be viewed as mutually interdependent and not mutually exclusive or distinct. Marx 
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suggested that consciousness could not exist independently of social reality. For example, 
language as a social product only exists as long as language using people exist. If all 
language using people stopped existing, language would die. Thus, objective reality is also 
not pure, it is a product of agency (or people practice). The world, according to Marx, was 
not purely given, unchanging, and fixed; it was changed by human practice from 
generation to generation. The idealism in true socialism did not provide for a significant 
theory of agency.  For example, when you look outside a window, the objective reality of 
nature has been changed and manipulated by human agency. The buildings, roads, and 
even the placement of the trees is more a product of organizational planning than the 
ongoing objective reality of nature. Hence, Marx solved the problem of the relationship 
between subject and object through human practice. 
Marx suggested three aspects of practice (Marx and Engels, 1932; Larrain, 1979). 
The first was in regards to basic human nature; the human will to survive (subsistence 
structured on a cooperative division of labour). The second aspect of practice was that of 
intentional activity or intentional practice. This is the human ability to cognitively visualize 
what the intentional activity will produce (people function intentionally and not 
instinctually). The third aspect of practice was the element of totality. People produce 
both their needs for survival, as well as the social society of “cooperation” (social nature 
of humans). This reproductive practice produces material and social needs which become 
fixed and entrenched forms of reality and consciousness. For example, when a tool has 
been invented, its use tends to take power unto itself. A spade must be used in its most 
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effective way – the spade becomes dominating over the way humans dig. For Marx, the 
dominance of this objective reality becomes the way humans live. Those without a spade 
suffer while those with the new technology dominate. Thus, it is through this 
reproductive practice that inequality is produced, reproduced, and maintained. A 
question that arises here is that some forms of reproductive practice produce objective 
realities that do not dominate; Marx does not seem to accommodate for liberating 
reproductive practices like universal health care, environmental protection programs, or 
corporate revenue sharing. Regardless, Marx argued that not only material reality, but 
also social forms become entrenched, fixed forms of “cooperation”. According to Marx, 
sex trade workers or midwives lobbying government for rights only reaffirms the notion 
that capitalism works, regardless of systemic issues like poverty or exploitation. 
Ultimately, according to Marx, through reproductive practice, humans sustain existence; 
although that existence may not be equal, and some may have more agency than others 
to affect systems and structures of cooperation, everyone is influenced (Marx and Engels, 
1932; Larrain, 1979). 
Here, Marx seems to miss Foucault’s concern of localized resistance and not full 
scale structural revolution. For Foucault, no evolution exists as moments must be 
analyzed within an archive; however, Marx continued his conspiratorial evolution of 
domination by defining contradictions as potential false values within ideology. For Marx, 
the relationship between consciousness and reality produced unintended consequences 
or relations of domination (i.e. the rich over the poor), called contradictions.  
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Contradictions are a social phenomenon which entail two mutually interdependent and 
opposite forces, specifically the “cooperative” relationship of subject and object. Thus, 
ideology is the result of the human inability to solve contradictions through human 
practice. When material or social reality becomes objectified in consciousness, it becomes 
a distortion (false consciousness) and not error. This distortion cannot be solved in 
consciousness and must be worked out through practice. For example, “the division of 
labour inside a nation leads at first to the separation of industrial and commercial from 
agricultural labour, and hence the separation of town and country and to the conflict of 
their interests” (italics original) (Marx and Engels, 1932: 32). For Marx the division 
continues between public and private interests, capital and labour, and the social classes. 
These contradictory relations become the standard for social life and have objective 
power over people. In this regard, ideology for Marx has a functional quality because 
contradictions must be brought out of consciousness and resolved in revolutionary 
practice through the relations of subject and structure.  
In the case of legitimated ideology, the dominating few have “universalized” their 
interests. Thus, the majority solves the problem of inequality through presenting interests 
as shared (much like the political rhetoric of election campaigns). One defence of this 
form of false consciousness, according to Marx, is revolution. Here, it is important to look 
at the work of Foucault who shows how localized resistance to the connection of 
knowledge and power free people from contradictions. For the purpose of this major 
paper, Marx, Foucault, Gadamer, and Giddens provide the methodology for analyzing 
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forms of hegemony, socially constructed knowledge (deviance designations through the 
discourse of science and criminology), and power. 
Deviance designations and state responses to deviance are socially constructed 
and supported by scientific laws that create an objective reality. Expert knowledge is 
translated into public policy serving the goals of government to punish the deviant. 
Foucault’s (1977, 1980) analysis of the repression of deviants centres on that 
questionable expert knowledge based on acceptable discourse which does not include 
the experience of those deemed deviant. The value of empirical laws is their ability to 
separate objective method from human experiences. Hans Georg Gadamer’s (1975; 1989) 
writing on truth and method argued that traditional knowledge was the overemphasis on 
method in its search to create knowledge.  
Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics: Interpretive Theory 
The classification scheme relied upon by social scientists accepts the idea that 
deviance is, by definition, classifiable behaviour that can be controlled (Fernandez, 1981). 
Thus, the value of empirical laws is the ability to separate objective methods from human 
experiences. Gadamer’s (1975; 1989) writing on truth and method argued that scientific 
positivism (and the empirical laws generated) overemphasized method in its search for 
truth in knowledge. Working within hermeneutics, which is the theory of interpretation 
or the understanding of human actions, products, and institutions, Gadamer (1975; 1989) 
argued that intellectuals developing knowledge of human nature were wrongly reliant on 
objective methods.  
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In Gadamer’s (1975; 1989) philosophical hermeneutics, he argued “objective” 
knowledge with the exclusion of human nature and experience was not possible because 
human beings were fundamentally a part of nature, but also part of a “second nature”. 
This acknowledgement of the neglected elements of human beings in pursuit of truth in 
social science was Gadamer’s greatest contribution to hermeneutics. Tradition is the 
primary neglected principle Gadamer highlighted to find alternative truth in social science 
(Gadamer, 1975). 
Tradition is one part of what Gadamer (1975; 1989) considered to be an 
interlocking system of the nature of human existence. Specifically, tradition is the set of 
meanings, presuppositions, and prejudgements passed on to members of society; a 
person is born into a tradition, learns/is taught its rules, and only then becomes critical of 
it. Deliberate reflection cannot occur before the tradition has already been learned and 
had some influence (Gadamer, 1975; 1989). For example, the industrial revolution, the 
Holocaust, or the terrorist attacks on 9/11 conjure rich discussion for all that learn, 
through language, their significance. The fundamental way the past continues to affect 
the present is through tradition, or what Gadamer called foreknowledge, which is an 
historical reality of being that casts “doubt” on all future ideas (Gadamer, 1975; 1989). 
Thus, value-free thinking is impossible as human beings have actually achieved the 
aforementioned traditional “common sense” body of knowledge filled with 
presuppositions and prejudgements (Gadamer, 1975; 1989). According to Gadamer,  
In fact history does not belong to us, but we belong to it. Long before we 
understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we 
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understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society and state in 
which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-
awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of 
historical life. That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his 
judgements, constitute the historical reality of his being (1975: 245). 
 
Yet, Gadamer (1975; 1989) argued that human beings were not “stuck” within a fixed 
tradition.  
The demands of the present were, according to Gadamer (1975; 1989), sufficiently 
strong to change early meanings, presuppositions, and prejudgements, which contributed 
to understanding (verstehen) and truth. Verstehen (understanding) resulted when human 
beings dialogued with the past and applied it to the present. Thus, when conditions 
change in the present, human beings have the ability to amend traditions. Through 
historicity, or the process in which the past continues to be active in the present, a 
constant dialogue occurs between the situated individual and their tradition resulting in a 
fusion (Gadamer, 1975; 1989). This fusion is possible because traditions are passed by 
language full of meanings beyond the stated text. 
As such, language is not only a means of communication, but part of what human 
beings want to communicate. For example, Gadamer (1975; 1989) suggested that 
everything said is not entirely clear and may carry more than one meaning. Thus, 
Gadamer (1975; 1989) suggested that language cannot be reduced to a mere tool for 
obtaining truths. Language strengthens the belonging to a tradition and the place of 
human beings in history while also allowing for an extenuation of the present situation 
(Gadamer, 1975; 1989). 
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The form of truth not susceptible or reachable by a positivist methodology is 
phronesis (good judgement). This kind of moral truth, according to Gadamer (1975; 1989), 
cannot be taught, it must be understood through practice. Gadamer (1975; 1989) 
referred to practical philosophy as the ability to have good judgement (or phronesis) 
which is beyond the “normal” discussions of morality – it is the knowledge of what is best 
to do in the particular situation. According to Gadamer (1975; 1989), the technical 
judgements can be learned. It is the ethical considerations that are gained through 
practice. An example of this knowledge application is when a judge must understand 
technical laws; however, to make good judgements, they must consider the situational 
circumstances. Mitigating circumstances and substantive inequalities must be considered 
to achieve the best decision. This moral knowledge is acquired through tradition and is 
considered in light of specific situations (Gadamer, 1975; 1989). Gadamer (1975; 1989), 
through his discussion of phronesis, did not suggest a universal reason, but suggested a 
practical wisdom in the here and now where full and reliable knowledge is not available.  
Gadamer (1975; 1989) suggested that when a scientific method is used to explain 
human experience, no room remains for human, social nature. Traditional wisdom, 
beliefs, and values stored and passed through language are removed from objective 
scientific methods. For example, through controlled observations and empirical 
experimentations, the effects of the past on the present are avoided, ignored, and 
neutralized. The trend of intelligence lead, actuarial criminology avoids examination of 
the social causes of deviance rather “Crime should be seen simply as ‘a risk to be 
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calculated (both by the offender and the potential victim) or an accident to be avoided” 
(Garland, 1996: 451). This view of scientifically proven, individually assessed, deviance is 
consistent with neo-liberal goals of responsibilization and “reveals the inroads made by 
neo-liberal methodological individualism as it feeds into the strategies of privatization 
and ‘responsibilisation’ pursued by governments confronting the perceived failure of the 
state to deliver effective crime control” (Bendle, 1999: 52). Power issues, inequalities, 
social responsibility, and questions of socially constructed deviance are abstracted and 
the individual is held responsible for the social problems the government cannot solve. 
Fortunately, social control theorists have slowly chipped away at this objective 
idealism. As cited by Mazer (1978), studies showing that behaviours defined as deviant 
were dependent on the values of professionals as much as on the characteristics of the 
assessed. Specifically, their study analyzed the political views of clients and professionals. 
If the views between the two coincided, the assessment was promising. But, if the 
difference in political philosophy was large, the judgement was affected. The politically 
deviant were perceived as “crazier”. It seems that human context and history is read into 
the assessment at its foundation, and regardless of the technical language used, empirical 
laws seem biased. What is called deviance is not a cultural-free phenomenon, but one 
that is culturally relative, varying from time to time and place to place. Class conflicts, 
oppression, historicity, and alternative knowledge bases are delegitimized by simply not 
being included in the method of science – the only legitimate law generating technique 
(Gadamer, 1975; 1989).  
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By neglecting the effect of the past in the present or alternative knowledge(s), the 
scientific method creates objective knowledge in social science. Power imbalances 
preclude the equality of voice in the construction of expert knowledge. When examining 
knowledge and public policy, Giddens (1984) asked whose meanings, norms, and rules 
were being made effective? This question is critical to criminal justice public policy, 
specifically due to the increased popularity in neo-liberal responsibilization strategies and 
the state’s reliance on criminal justice research (Jones, 1986; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003; 
Gilsinian, 2004). The relationship between agents and structures must be at the forefront 
of theoretical social science bridging the gap between face to face interactions – agency – 
and social control.  
Anthony Giddens’ Theory of Structuration: Reconciling the Tensions 
between Agency and Constraint  
 
Giddens’ (1981; 1982) theory of structuration neutralized the antagonistic 
relationship between positivism and interpretive theory (hermeneutics) by creating a 
dualism for structure and agency. The apparent contradiction in the epistemologies of 
positivism and social science is thus resolved; one being an objective truth generating 
paradigm and the other being a journey toward understanding. Giddens (1981; 1982) 
decided both sciences were needed to achieve truth and thus created a dualism between 
structure and agency. A mutual dependence must exist between a structural analysis 
(positivism) and a theory of agency (hermeneutics), and the same emphasis needed to be 
placed on structure and agency, something positivists and interpretive/hermeneutic 
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theorists did not do (Giddens, 1981; 1982). Hence, Giddens defined agency (face to face 
interactions) and constraint (institutional analysis) in a compatible way in which these 
ideas were mutually dependent and interdependent. The theory of structuration was able 
to accomplish this by lessening the deterministic effect of structure and strengthening a 
theory of agency (Giddens, 1981; 1982). In this regard, Giddens broke from interpretive 
hermeneutic theory by acknowledging that agents were not completely autonomous. He 
also broke from structural theory by acknowledging the enabling function of institutions. 
Hence, Giddens (1981; 1982) combined agency and constraint in an integrated way 
stressing the duality of structures as both enabling and constraining, as well as the 
transformative capacity of agents to negotiate and draw upon resources in their own 
interests. In diagram form, Giddens’ (1984: 25) duality of structure looks like this: 
 
 FIGURE 2: DUALITY OF STRUCTURE 
 
 
This figure illustrates the enabling and constraining relationship of agents and structures, 
and the mutually productive process of creation and re-creation in which the social 
actions of people maintain and alter the structures of society (Giddens, 1984). 
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 Giddens (1984) placed people at the centre of theory. Human action is the 
continuous flow of conduct, thus, people must be placed at the centre of a theory 
stressing the importance of agents to produce, sustain, and transform society as this is 
the ontological relationship that exists. People produce and reproduce structures 
(Giddens, 1984). Giddens’ (1984) definition of action emphasized the practical nature of 
conduct, the voluntary capacity of actors to intervene, and the creation and re-creation of 
the structure. Using the example of language, the structure of language, as a resource of 
rules, is absent until it becomes a concrete act in the system, primarily through face to 
face interaction. Thus, when agents draw upon structure as a resource using specific rules 
and also being constrained by them, the structure becomes the means of their actions as 
well as their outcome (Giddens, 1984). The consequences of this dualism of structure can 
be summarized as: 
1. Production and reproduction of the structure has both constraining and 
enabling features because the structure acts both as a resource which 
encompasses the rules, resources, norms, and sanctions, as well as the 
inducements. 
 
2. The structure enables and constrains agents. Agents do not have complete 
autonomy because of the rules, restraints, and sanctions, but the structure is 
not completely deterministic as there is the transformative capacity of agents. 
 
3. The structure and agency are mutually dependent. In order to perpetuate its 
existence, the structure needs the agent to draw upon it as a resource 
(Giddens, 1982; 1984). 
 
Structures act as enabling and constraining resources which agents draw upon and, in 
doing so, their actions become concrete acts in society (Giddens, 1984). In order to 
maintain a mutual relationship between agency and structure, Giddens lessenes the 
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deterministic effect of structure by referring to structure as a resource that is both 
enabling and constraining (Giddens, 1984). Agents draw upon structure as a resource, not 
to be completely determined by it, allowing for negotiation and the ability to act or not to 
act freely. However, there are limitations within agency as complete autonomy from the 
structure is not possible (Giddens, 1984).  
 Agents have limitations on their capabilities to rationalize actions because 
knowledge in all its forms is always incomplete or even unconscious/unknowable 
(Giddens, 1984). Thus, the knowledge of actions and the ability to rationalize action is 
always incomplete, relationships among and between agents are never completely one 
sided. Relationships are a mutual affair and one of a “dialectic of control” (Giddens, 
1984). The example of prostitution explains the dialect of control. As examined by 
Sanchez (1999), prostitutes believe that they have a less attractive lifestyle or occupation 
options, but they choose to work in the sex trade (Sanchez, 1999). Often, the less 
attractive alternatives include living in abusive environments or being homeless. These 
women make a choice, but not within the structural constraints they find themselves. 
Regardless, Sanchez (1999) emphasized that prostitutes interpret their choice as 
exercising their agency within the limits of choices available. Their agency is limited by the 
structural constraints in which they find themselves, such as abuse, poverty, and 
unemployment. Agency and structural constraints are as interdependent as the dialectic 
of control.  
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 Both sides of any relationship exercise a transformative capacity to negotiate and 
to act (or not) in certain ways in a given situation. The ultimate example is suicide. 
Theoretically, everyone possesses the capacity to commit suicide. Although extreme, this 
example can be seen as an act of autonomy and stresses a relationship that is always a 
two-way affair. Within the “dialectic of control”, agents are not completely dominated, 
nor completely empowered. For example, the changing definition of deviance in relation 
to midwifery, prostitution, and youth crime provides the contextual examples of this 
dialectic of control. Practices once deemed deviant are now managed as legitimate 
activity through a process of cooptation. Policy preferences are also dependent on 
historical practices, which both enable and constrain the options available to decision 
makers (Krasner, 1988). Along with historical practices, limited knowledge, as well as the 
inability to predict outcomes, creates crime prevention practices that have displaced 
deviance from neighbourhood to neighbourhood. For example, it has been argued that 
areas under surveillance by closed circuit television (CCTV) have had the intended and 
unintended effect of changing the extent, type, and location of crime (Phillips, 1999). 
Thus, because of the limitations of knowledge, everyone possesses a degree of power 
which may be uneven, but not absolute (Giddens, 1984).  
Regardless, the interchange between limited knowledge, agency, and constraint 
always functions as sources of power (Giddens, 1984). Power, logically related to action, 
takes two forms: the power people exercise over people against their will and “power 
with consent” (Giddens, 1984). The consensual form of power is primarily the influences 
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of one on another through a “dialogue or discussion” such as voluntary negotiations and 
public demonstrations about controversial issues like globalization and environmental 
crimes (Giddens, 1984). Giddens (1984) stressed that both forms of power are contingent 
on agency and one’s willingness to act. Giddens’ (1984) dualism of power and agency is 
consistent with his dualism of structure (as both a resource and a constraint), as well as 
his dualism between both structure and agency. Yet, there is a problem with this analysis. 
Willingness to act does not equate to “free” acts of agency. For example, Giddens (1984) 
acknowledged limited choice when faced with power; agents have choice, but not within 
the conditions of their own choosing.  
Henry and Milovanovich (2000) developed their constitutive theory of criminology 
based on the work of Giddens (1984) by describing the interrelationship of agency and 
constrain as a duality between agency and structure. Henry and Milovanovich (2000) 
constitutive theory is a postmodernist perspective that worked to combine classical, 
positivistic, and critical criminology to understand the modern world of crime. 
Their constitutive integrative approach constitutes a model of crime and 
justice that incorporates the overlapping spheres of classical, positivist, and 
critical criminology, thereby establishing a framework of crime and justice 
that is capable of connecting the various contradictory bodies of 
criminological knowledge. This kind of synthesis resists the biased, reductive, 
and competitive “micro” and “macro” formulations of modernist integrations 
that have failed to appreciate the constitutive nature of crime and injustice 
as these have cut across the domains of discursively produced knowledge 
(Barak, 1996:4). 
 
Their focus is on the interdependency of agency and structure that creates and 
perpetuates the ongoing social context of crime. Their primary concern was not with the 
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causes of criminality, but the relations that coproduce offending so the cycle can be 
interrupted and the ongoing harm reduced.  
Our position calls for an abandoning of the futile search for the causes of 
crime because that simply elaborates the distinction that maintains crime as 
a separate reality while failing to address how it is that crime is constituted 
as part of society. We are concerned, instead, with the ways in which human 
agents actively coproduce that which they take to be crime (Henry and 
Milovanovic, 1991: 307). 
 
By avoiding a duality of blame or individual causes analysis, Henry and Milovanovich 
(1991) emphasized the interrelationships between agency and structure in the creation 
and re-creation of social systems that construct the reality of deviance. Criminologists 
must look beyond lawbreakers when researching the complex social problems of crime. 
The disenfranchised are demanding fair treatment, and with advances in modern 
technology the voices of the marginalized are being heard. An expert looking to advance 
knowledge to inform policy makers must ask why the structures and systems of inequality 
continue to be socially constructed at the expense of the disenfranchised. Crime can no 
longer be examined as an activity by deviants that exist outside the system waiting to be 
targeted, treated, punished, or held responsible. The questions essential to criminologists 
must be why deviance is socially constructed and reconstructed in line with changing 
governmental goals, how political, economic, educational, and social systems continue to 
be socially constructed to exclude some from the infrastructure, whose interests and 
expert knowledge become the socially constructed truth, and is the system of justice 
ultimately socially constructed. As the practice of justice becomes increasingly dependent 
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on the work of criminologists using technology to identify and manage high risk 
lawbreakers, these questions are also critical for lawmakers.  
In summary, this analysis does not advocate for advancing another truth in 
uncovering the social construction of knowledge and public policy. This work attempts to 
contribute to an understanding (verstehen) of the interrelationship between agency, 
constraint, knowledge/power, and politics in order to overcome the gap in knowledge for 
policy development. The science of criminology and its reliance on positivistic methods 
has, in part, determined its present role in criminal justice public policy to identify, target, 
and risk-assess offenders for punishment and treatment. Class conflicts, oppression, and 
alternative knowledge bases are not included in the method of science. Thus, by 
neglecting the affect of the past in the present, the scientific method can calculate 
deviance as a risk that can be managed without considering social causes. Theoretical 
criminology had been pivotal in explaining the social causes of deviance through anomie, 
sub-culture, and social control, but now the focus is on neo-liberal, economic principles of 
individual responsibility. 
A social science, like criminology, must acknowledge language, consciousness, and 
lay knowledge(s), as well as the structural components of an inherently inequitable 
society by adopting a theory that is mutually dependent on agency and constraint. For 
public policy to reflect the interests of the people it serves, an understanding of agency 
must be at the forefront of theory building in criminology. Ordinary, lay knowledge is vital 
in the reproduction and production of society, not merely the technical language of 
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theoretical narratives and models. To ensure truth is reflected in public policy, 
researchers must traverse the hermeneutic circle in structuration by interpreting not only 
the issue/event under study, but also the interpreter, while consistently questioning 
history. By integrating the experiences of people within a structural analysis, a bridge can 
exist between an understanding of agency and constraint for theory development and 
public policy. 
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